20 specific instance of patient care. Both levels of application are mediated neither by science nor by art but by an entirely discursively-constructed set of communicative and interpretive practices: the material of the humanities disciplines. But as long as medicine understands itself as two-sided, as a science and an art (or as technical ability and bedside manner), its practitioners will be kept from understanding fully what they do and how it works. The dualism popularized and naturalized after Snow forecloses the possibility of questioning the epistemology, ethics, and language of both biomedical science and clinical practice.
This uneasy pairing of science and art excludes the humanities. Blinkered by Snow's binary, it is all too easy to lump the humanities with art. Many who strongly support practices broadly termed the medical humanities make this mistake as a matter of course. Doing so deprives medical researchers, practitioners, and educators of a position from which they might understand their work as an historically, socially, and culturally contingent activity. Such a position would not diminish any of the massively significant value either of medical research or of compassionate care, but it would remediate an aporia that arguably sustains many of the problems currently facing western medicine. It need not have been this way: before Snow, there was Huxley. As I will show, Huxley understood the natural sciences, the human sciences, and the creative arts as three interconnected domains. This provides a valuable prehistory for positions adopted by the ScienceHumanities, with its call for a more nuanced understanding of how disciplines interact and collaborate, and of the methods and the politics adopted in doing so.
Huxley's Triad
In "Science and Art," a speech given in 1883 at the Royal Academy of Art, T. H. Huxley addressed the anxiety in Matthew Arnold's view of science as a threat to liberal education: "I think there are many persons who look upon this new birth of our times," -science -"as a sort of monster rising out of the sea of modern thought with the purpose of devouring the Andromeda of art" (Huxley 682). This mythological caricature establishes an antagonism between unequals, one ugly and predatory, the other beautiful and passive (and bound naked to a rock as a sacrificial offering). But we know the story, and the monster does not get to kill Andromeda. Huxley triangulates the dichotomy, reminding us of the third figure: "Perseus, equipped with the shoes of swiftness of the ready writer, with the cape of invisibility of the editorial article, and it may be said with the Medusa-head of vituperation, shows himself ready to try conclusions with the scientific dragon" (682). Our hero writes, publishes, and, when necessary, scolds violently. He can turn you to stone with his rhetoric. Huxley's Perseus, as public intellectual, critic, or humanities scholar, is heroic not because there is any chance he might kill science (even though he can offer wise critical opposition) in order to rescue art (who is less passive than she looks and does not really need rescuing at all), but because he gives us a vantage point from which to reconsider the terms of Arnold's purported fear of science as the enemy of art.
Huxley warns us against assuming we know how the story ends: Perseus should not just attack the monster (it may win); science instead "respects the lady (art) and desires nothing more than to see her happily settled and annually producing a flock of charming children" (works of art, that is) (682). Obviously a great deal more can be said about Huxley's analogy (and its intended reception), but one point is crucial here: Perseus, the intervening third element -the humanities -acts as an interpreter and mediator. We might imagine Medusa's head as a sort of pause button, freezing things in place so Perseus can say stop, wait, what's the story here? -and then negotiate a fruitful truce based on a more precise definition of terms. Shakespeare, Mammography, and the Second Law of Thermodynamics Re-inserting Perseus into the picture of Andromeda and the sea monster enables us to see the misalignment that, I think, has made the naturalizing use of Snow's binary so harmful. This can be demonstrated by considering a letter to the editor published in The Times of London in August 2017. In the face of concern over a too-extreme pendulum swing toward STEM in British secondary education, molecular biologist P. J. G. Butler was responding to an opinion piece in which journalist Libby Purves warned against a rivalry between science and arts. Butler claims that scientists are better educated than those "in the arts and humanities"; as evidence, he describes how he has "enjoy[ed] discussions with colleagues . . . about music, theatre and art, and [. . . had] regular chats about that week's programme at the Arts Theatre." This, he says, demonstrates scientists' interest in and knowledge of "the arts and humanities," as opposed to those on the other side of the binary, who do not seem to aspire to an equivalent "interest and knowledge in the sciences." Butler's point is a variation on Snow's own much-repeated claim that most of his friends in the arts were stumped when he asked them to "describe the Second Law of Thermodynamics," even though, as he saw it, this was "asking something which is about the scientific equivalent of: 'Have you read a work of Shakespeare's?'" (Snow, 15) . Like Snow's, Butler's analogy is misaligned, not only by clumping "arts and humanities" together, but also because, lacking the perspective of the humanities, he sees neither science nor art clearly.
To realign the analogy, we (taking the role of Perseus) must see that consuming (enjoying, appreciating, criticizing) a work of creative art does not require an understanding of how it works. Let's say the molecular biologist and his friend, a biochemist, have both seen a recent production of Macbeth -although it could as well be a television sitcom or a comic book, for the difficulty or cultural prestige of the object does not matter. The scientists chat about the play -no, they exchange thoughtful and well-supported opinions, applauding the special effects in the witches' scenes, disagreeing about the effectiveness of an unconventional delivery of the "brief candle" speech, wondering whether the parallels they saw with current news on Scottish nationalism were intended by the producers, and so on.
Meantime, a painter and her friend, a poet, find that each has recently undergone a routine screening mammogram. They make observations about the experience, comparing advice given by their GPs (perhaps one doctor recommends self-exams, the other does not), media coverage of changes to these recommendations, and of the probability of false positives and unnecessary biopsies. One found the procedure more painful than the other did. Perhaps they speculate about a friend who recently tested positive for the BRCA1 genetic predisposition to breast cancer. This is the equivalent of Butler's engagement with art. No specialist expertise is needed in either conversation but, forced by Snow's binary into clumping together the arts and the humanities, Butler appears to disregard the fact that there is more to understanding Macbeth than viewing or reading it. Our poet, on the other hand, is under no illusion that she understands the physics of ionizing radiation or the pathology visualization needed to generate the conclusion that her breast tissue looks normal.
Given time we might reverse engineer Snow's two cultures from this more accurately aligned starting point -see figure 2 -and perhaps trace out the different accounts of expertise, from the ubiquitous to the specialized, that each stage entails (see Collins and Evans) . Discussing an experience, evaluating its quality and exploring its meaning, is the social processing of a cultural object. Specialized knowledge and vocabulary are not necessary, despite differences in access to more or less sophisticated ways of processing and articulating the experience. Some people will not be able to afford either experience; some will choose not to undergo them. All these products depend on the technical application of knowledge of the natural world, the knowledge we usually think of as scientific yet, like having a mammogram, experiencing a work of art does not require an understanding of the technological applications of science that make it available: theatre lighting, say, or video streaming, or the printing press. Or, more to the point here, that fundamental human technology: language. To appreciate Macbeth you do not need to understand or even notice prosody, dramatic form, the evolution of English orthography, the political context of the play's first performances, the history of its production in the twentieth or eighteenth century, and so on. You do not need to have a theory of tragedy, or of the 
